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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
We conduct an experiment to examine the strategic 
use of trust in an environment similar to Berg, 
Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) investment game. 
The environment differs in that the second mover 
is restricted to the binary choice of returning half 
of the tripled amount (fair split) or zero (selfish 
split). We use the theory of guilt aversion to 
explain the behavior in strategic and non-strategic 
environments represented by playing the game 
sequentially and simultaneously respectively. We 
find that in the sequential treatment first movers 
invest significantly more than when the transfer 
decisions are conducted simultaneously. Moreover, 
in line with the theoretical prediction, 91% of 
subjects who invested the entire endowment 
received half of the surplus. On the other hand 
only 5% of subjects who invested anything less 
than the entire endowment received half. In the 
simultaneous treatment the proportions yield 
11.1% and 32.1% respectively. These allocations 
along with the beliefs collected in a salient manner 




A number of studies have shown that trust 
plays a critical role in economic relationships. 
Consider a simplest form of a trust (or a hold-up) 
situation (Williamson, 1975). Initially, an investor 
has an option to invest towards a project which an 
entrepreneur will carry out. If the investor invests, 
a surplus is created on the side of the entrepreneur. 
The question is how she will divide this surplus 
between herself and the investor. A unique 
subgame-perfect equilibrium paints a gloomy 
picture: the entrepreneur keeps the whole surplus 
and the investor does not invest, i.e., a relationship 
does not form. However, in real life, these types of 
situations occur quite frequently and parties to a 
relationship are able to overcome the incentive 
problem even in the absence of contracts. Berg et 
al. (1995) have studied the trust game in laboratory 
conditions. They found significant deviations from 
classical equilibrium behavior: often it is the case 
that the investor invests and the entrepreneur 
chooses a fair division of the surplus. A leading 
explanation is trust. The investor trusts the 
entrepreneur to divide the surplus fairly, which 
prompts her to invest. The entrepreneur, in turn, 
rewards her mind-set (trusting behavior) with a fair 
division of the surplus. This evidence suggests that 
trust could play an important role in fostering 
relationships. 
The objective in this paper is to explore 
strategic implications of trust. The investor in the 
trust game could decide to invest for two different 
reasons. First, she could be a generally "trusting" 
(type of) person who believes that most people are 
fair, and accordingly, she expects the entrepreneur 
to split the surplus fairly. Her belief about the 
proportion of fair individuals in population is 
purely subjective and summarizes her own 
experiences and biases. Secondly, she could not be 
a trusting person; she believes there are 
sufficiently many people in a population who are 
opportunistic (selfish) and would keep the whole 
surplus. Her beliefs about the average response of 
the entrepreneur are not high enough on their own 
to induce investment. However, she is aware of the 
fact that some of the opportunistic entrepreneurs 
could interpret investment as a sign of trust and 
reward this trust with a fair split. Thus, if she 
invests her chances of receiving a fair split rise due 
to the proportion of entrepreneurs who reward trust 
when they see it. This may give the investor 
sufficient incentives to invest. The main difference 
between the first and the second motivation is that 
in the first the investor's degree of trust is directly 
tied to her inherent initial belief about the amount 
of fairness in the population of investors. In the 
second, on the other hand, she exploits the 
signaling value of investing as a way of 
communicating trust to the entrepreneur. The 
investor counts on the fact that the entrepreneur 
rewards her with a fair split. This raises a 
following question: to what extend is trusting 
behavior motivated by the investor's inherent 
belief and to what extend is it a strategic decision 
relying on the value of signaling trust. It is this 
question that we hope to settle in this paper. 
Although there is currently a large body 
of literature exploring various aspects of trust, 
there is no uniformly accepted theory about what 
trust is and how it originates. Several models 
attempt to explain trust as a product of rational 
behavior.  For example,  Dufwenberg (2002), 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002), Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2006), and Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2007) rely on the theory of guilt 
aversion; Falk and Fischbacher (2006) make 
argument based on reciprocity; and Sliwka 
(forthcoming) defines conformist-types of 
individuals who trust only when they believe 
others do. Here we adopt the view of Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2007) who interpret trust in the 
framework of guilt-aversion. This story has 
already received some empirical support in 
experimental studies of Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
(2002), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), 
Schnedler and Vadovič (2007), and Dufwenberg et 
al. (2007), and it allows for introducing strategic 
considerations of trust in a tractable way. The main 
idea is that if the entrepreneur is guilt-averse then 
she will experience a disutility from feeling guilty 
whenever she "hurts her opponent," i.e., returns the 
investor less than what was expected. Notice that 
the entrepreneur's utility depends on her belief 
about what the investor expects her to do. This 
feature of the model makes it an example of 
(dynamic) psychological game. To avoid guilt, a 
sufficiently guilt-averse entrepreneur will 
optimally split the surplus in a way that matches 
her belief about the expectations of the investor. 
Therefore, in this framework, the investor will 
trust the entrepreneur to split the surplus fairly 
only if she is confident that the entrepreneur holds 
sufficiently high belief about her expectations. 
The model of guilt-aversion helps us 
illustrate the benefits of signaling trust. Initially, 
the investor has a subjective belief about the share 
of the surplus she expects to receive. If this belief 
is high enough, then she optimally invests and if it 
is small, then she does not. However, we argue 
that even when the initial belief is small the 
investor may want to invest. The reason is that 
objective of the entrepreneur is not to match her 
initial belief, but the updated belief that takes into 
account the amount invested. Because the 
entrepreneur moves second, she observes the 
amount invested prior to making her decision. Her 
belief about the share expected by the investor 
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should then depend on the size of the investment. 
Higher investment signals a stronger belief in 
receiving a fair share of the surplus. Hence, the 
incentives of the guilt-averse entrepreneur to split 
the surplus fairly should grow in the amount 
invested. 
Notice that the crucial element in this 
logic is that the investment is used as a (credible) 
commitment device. The greater the investment 
the greater the loss to the investor if the 
entrepreneur decides to keep everything. Because 
of such credible exposure, it should be 
unambiguous that the investor has a high 
expectations. Hence, the entrepreneur should 
revise her belief upwards and then split the surplus 
fairly to avoid feeling guilty. This reasoning is also 
known as psychological forward induction 
(Duwfenberg and Battigalli, 2007). Thus, what we 
call "trust signaling" could be understood in the 
context of guilt-aversion as follows: higher 
investment credibly signals higher expectations of 
the investor that are matched by the guilt-averse 
entrepreneur. 
To illustrate the effect of a strategic use of 
trust on a relationship we run an experiment with 
two treatments. In both treatments players A and B 
play a modified investment game. Player A 
decides how much to invest, i.e., she chooses 
amount t from the interval between 0 and 10. The 
invested amount is tripled by the experimenter. 
Player B then decides whether to return a fair split, 
3t/2, or a selfish split, 0, back to the player A. 
Notice that the difference between this game and 
the classical investment game is that here B's 
decision is binary, that is, no splits other than fair 
and selfish are possible. 
The treatments vary in how information is 
displayed. In the first treatment players A and B 
play the game sequentially. B makes her decision 
only after having observed what A has done. In 
this treatment we expect both the inherent belief 
and the strategic signaling of trust to matter. In the 
second treatment, both players make their 
decisions simultaneously. Therefore, player B 
must make her decision without knowing the 
investment decision of player A. This eliminates 
the possibility of A signaling trust via her high 
investment. In this treatment, we expect that 
displayed trusting behavior purely reflects subjects' 
inherent (initial) beliefs about the proportion of 
fair individuals in the population. The difference 
between these two treatments will measure the 
importance of the strategic use of trust. 
Our game differs from the previous 
experimental literature on guilt-aversion in two 
major ways. First, our main focus is on the 
behavior of player A in terms of signaling her 
beliefs. In contrast, Dufwenberg and Gneezy 
(2000) measure the correlation between the outside 
option of player A and the amount player A 
receives from B in a lost wallet game. 
Surprisingly, they find there is none. However, 
their results show a positive correlation between 
how much player B allocates to player A and B's 
expectations of how much A expects B to allocate. 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) examine the 
effects of promises made by player B on the 
decision of player A. Unlike our game, their game 
includes a chance move so that it is not detectable 
whether player B defaulted on her promise or 
whether it was just a bad state of the world. They 
find that pre-play communication might influence 
the motivation and behavior of the subjects by 
affecting beliefs about beliefs. Dufwenberg et al. 
(2007) create an environment where subjects can 
strike an informal agreement about how much 
should be returned upon investment. If an 
agreement is made the beliefs of both players 
coincide. The experimental data reveal that players 
A are influenced by agreements and invest more 
often, however a large fraction of players B 
behaves opportunistically and defaults. 
Dufwenberg et al. find that only about 1/3 of 
players B honor the informal agreements. Second, 
our game is different in structure. It is the player 
A, who has a rich action set in comparison to rich 
action set of player B in experiments by 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Dufwenberg 
et al. (2007). Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) use 
a game where choices of both players and nature 
are binary. 
 The rest of the paper is organized in the 
following manner. Section 2 presents the formal 
model of trust signaling. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design and procedures. In section 4 
we test the hypotheses and discuss the 
experimental results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Trust Signaling 
 
There are two players A and B. Player A 
moves first and decides how much of their 
endowment they want to send to player B, [ ]0,1t∈ , and how much to keep for themselves 
( )1 t− . The amount sent is tripled when it reaches 
player B. Player B must decide whether to return a 
"fair split" of 3 2t  or a "selfish split" of 0. We 
study behavior in two different versions of this 
game with timing of play as our treatment variable. 
In the first version, the game is played 
sequentially, and thus B does observe t before 
making her decision. In the second version, the 
game is played simultaneously, and thus player B 
does not observe t.  
Let us suppose that the player B is averse 
to guilt. This means that her utility depends on 
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what she believes player A expects her to do. If 
she falls short of A's expectations, i.e., she chooses 
the selfish split when A expected to receive a fair 
amount, then she experiences a feeling of guilt 
which is proportional to the difference of what was 
expected and what was received by A. To be a 
little more precise, denote α as the initial belief 
that player A assigns to what B is going to do, i.e., 
. And, let ( )Pr "fair split"α = Bα  denote B's 
estimate ofα . If B chooses a selfish split, then she 
disappoints A (lets A down) in the amount 
( )3 2tα and experiences guilt in the magnitude 
( )3 2B B tθ α , where θ is the guilt-aversion 
parameter and [ ]0,1θ ∈ . On the other hand, if 
she sends 3 2t back to A, then she avoids feeling 
guilty but incurs a monetary cost in the amount 
3 2t . Hence, for a given belief Bα , B will 
choose a fair split if 








that is, if Bα  is sufficiently high. If Bα  is low, 
she will keep everything. The decision of the 
player A is based on her own belief, α , of what B 
is going to do. If 1 Bα θ≥  (and A assumes that 
Bα  is a correct estimate of α ) then A should be 
confident that B will chose the fair split and hence 
she should send . If 1t = 1 Bα θ≥  then she 
should send 0. 
We focus first on what happens in the 
sequential game when t is observed by B before 
making her decision. Now, player A may be able 
to "communicate" though her action, t, how 
confident she is about receiving 3 2t . Notice that 
given her belief, α , A's payoff is given by 
( )( ) ( )(1 3 2 1 1t t tα − + + − − )α . 
A quick look at this expression reveals that her 
payoff is increasing in t if 
2 3α ≥ , 
and decreasing otherwise. Hence, if A trusts B 
sufficiently to choose the fair split, then A will 
maximize her payoff by sending  to B. On 
the other hand, if A is doubtful about receiving a 
fair share, i.e., 
1t =
2 3α < , then she should send 
nothing to B. However, since t is now observable, 
B can use it to infer more information about α and 
revise her own belief Bα . Let ( )ˆB B tα α=  be 
the updated belief of B after having observed t. In 
particular, if B observes , then she should 
revise her belief to 
1t =
ˆ 2 3Bα ≥  and, vice versa, if 
0t =  was observed, then B's belief should be 
ˆ 2 3Bα < . Next, if we assume that Bθ  is 
sufficiently high, i.e., 3 2Bθ ≥ , then this implies 
that after observing , it must be that 1t =
ˆ3 2 1B Bθ α≥ ≥ . This is sufficient to induce B 
to choose the fair split. But then, player A should 
be confident to get the fair return after sending 
1t = . As a result she will always have an 
incentive to send 1t = . Thus, when t is 
observable, our theory predicts a single outcome 
( 1t = , Fair split). In other words, player A signals 
her high expectations to player B who will then 
match these expectations by choosing the fair split. 
Next let us examine what happens in the 
simultaneous game where t is not observed. Both 
players will face some uncertainty about their 
respective beliefs. Player B bases her decision on 
her own guess of A's expectations, Bα . On the 
other hand, player A's expectations, α , will 
correspond to her guess about what B is planning 
to do.  Each player's belief is subject to her own 
experiences and biases. Because of this, the beliefs 
of both players will most likely not be identical in 
the environment of one-shot games, as in our 
design, where it is impossible to learn/identify 
behavioral traits of their counterparts.  If we 
restricted ourselves to only analyze equilibrium 
behavior in which the beliefs coincide, i.e., 
Bα α= , then we may falsely reject a true 
hypothesis.  Therefore, we will focus on whether 
the decisions and beliefs of the individual are 
consistent with the theory of guilt aversion, and 
not specifically whether they are consistent with 
their counterpart’s decision and beliefs.  When 
players act optimally subject to their own beliefs, 
our theory predicts four different kinds of 
outcomes: ( 1t = , Fair split), ( , Selfish split), 
(
1t =
0t = , Fair split), ( 0t = , Selfish split).  
 
3. Procedures and Experiment 
 
The general structure of the trust game is 
similar to Berg et al. (1995). In the first stage of 
each trust game, players A were endowed with 
$10NZ. They had to decide how much of this 
endowment they wanted to keep for themselves 
and how much to transfer to their anonymous 
player B counterpart. This was done by circling 
one of the whole numbers ranging from zero to ten 
on their decision sheet. It was common knowledge 
that any amount transferred by player A would be 
tripled by the experimenter. That is, players B 
would receive three times the amount that their 
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player A counterpart transferred to them. In the 
second stage, players B must decide how much of 
the tripled amount they want to keep for 
themselves and how much to transfer back to their 
player A counterpart. This decision is restricted to 
a binary choice of either half or zero. Just as for 
players A, this decision was done by circling one 
of the two choices on their decision sheet. 
 We have two treatments in the 
experiment, i.e., sequential (SEQ) and 
simultaneous (SIM) play of the trust game.  Four 
sessions in total were conducted for each 
treatment.  The sequence of events in a session was 
the following. (1) A coin was flipped to determine 
player types. (2) The instructions were read aloud 
for the subjects, who followed along with their 
own copy. To assist in their understanding, a copy 
of the instructions was also placed on an overhead 
and any decisions sheets, tables, etc… were 
illustrated specifically. The subjects were 
encouraged to ask questions relating to the rules of 
the game at any time. (3) Both player types 
completed the belief elicitation task. (4) The 
experimenter collected the belief decision sheets 
and distributed the trust game decision sheets. (5) 
The sequence of events differed slightly between 
sessions implementing the sequential and 
simultaneous trust games. In the sequential trust 
game sessions, players A first made their transfer 
decision to players B. All decision sheets were 
collected and the amount transferred from players 
A were copied to their counterpart players' B 
decision sheets, which were then returned to 
players B. Presented with the decision of their 
player A counterpart, players B made their 
decision on whether to return half or zero. The 
experimenter collected all decision sheets, 
transferred the decision information of players B to 
their player A counterparts' decision sheet, and 
returned the decision sheets to all players to reveal 
their earnings. In the simultaneous trust game 
sessions, both player types of participants made 
their transfer decisions simultaneously. The 
experimenter collected all decision sheets, 
transferred the decision information each decision 
sheet to their counterparts', and returned the 
decision sheets to all players to reveal their 
earnings. (6) Subjects completed a short survey on 
the experiment and general demographic 
information for which they were paid $5 instead of 
a show up fee. This was not announced to the 
subjects at the start of the experiment. (8) Subjects 
were privately paid their earnings for the session. 
 
4.  Results 
 
The presentation of results is divided into two 
parts. In section 4.1 we discuss the findings using 
the decisions made by subjects in our experiment. 
Section 4.2 uses beliefs elicited during the 
experiment to ascertain whether there is further 
empirical support for trust signaling as explained 




The neoclassical subgame perfect 
equilibrium for both SEQ and SIM is for all 
players A to send 0t =  and all players B to return 
Zero.  The number of decisions consistent with this 
equilibrium is very different for players A and B 
across treatments.  Players A sent  only 5 out 
of 41 (12%) instances in SEQ and 4 out of 37 
(11%) instances in SIM.  On the other hand, 
players B returned ZERO 21 out of 41 (51%) 
instances in SEQ and 27 out of 37 (73%) instances 
in SIM. Nevertheless, the subgame perfect 
equilibrium predictions for self-regarding players 
do not find much support in our data. 
0t =
We now explore behavioral patterns in 
the data given the theory of trust signaling 
proposed in section 2.  Among the 41 pairs in 
SEQ, 21 (51%) of the players A sent  and 20 
(49%) of the players B returned HALF. Note that 
this analysis does not do justice to the theory of 
trust signaling since player A must send a high t in 
order to induce player B to return HALF.  
Therefore, if we focus only on those 21 pairs in 
which player A sent
1t =
1t = , 19 (91%) of the player 
B counterparts returned HALF, and thus there is 
strong support of the theory. 
Since (i) two of these outcomes involve 
player A sending 0t =  and (ii) signaling is not 
possible due to simultaneous decision making, we 
should observe players A sending greater t in SEQ 
than SIM.  The mean t sent by players A in SEQ 
and SIM was 6.59 and 5.22 respectively.  A one-
sided Mann-Whitney test indicates that they are 
significantly different at the 5% level (p=0.046).  
This result is also supported by comparing across 
treatments the number of players A who signal 
trust by sending 1t = . In SEQ, 21 out of 41 
(51%) players A sent  versus 9 out of 37 
(24%) in SIM.  According to a 1-sided Fisher’s 
exact test, the fraction of players A sending 
1t =
1t =  
is significantly higher in SEQ at the 5% level 
(p=0.013).  
We now turn our attention to the behavior 
of players B. We expect that significantly more 
players B return HALF in SEQ than in SIM. If this 
were not the case, then players A are making a 
serious mistake and would be much better off if 
they deviated to 0t = .  First, we examine the 
frequency of players B returning HALF on the 
aggregate level.  In SEQ, players B returned HALF 
49% (20 out of 41) of the time, whereas in SIM 
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players B returned HALF only 27% (10 out of 37) 
of the time.  According to a 1-sided Fisher’s exact 
test, the frequency of HALF in SEQ is significantly 
greater than SIM at the 5% level (p=0.040).  
Second, we study the behavior of players 
B conditional on her paired player A’s decision.  
As discussed previously, 19 out of 21 (91%) of 
players B returned HALF in SEQ when player A 
sent .  In only 1 out of 20 instances (5%) did 
player B return HALF when player A sent 
1t =
1t < .  
Obviously in SEQ, the decision of player B of 
whether to return HALF or ZERO depended 
heavily upon the observed decision of player A. 
This clear pattern is not present in the SIM data 
where t is not observable to players B before they 
make their decisions.  When player A sent 1t =  in 
SIM, only 1 out of 9 (11%) players B returned 
HALF compared to 9 out of 28 (32%) when player 
A sent .  Since we are not limiting ourselves 
to the theoretical predictions for this treatment, we 
use a 2-sided Fisher’s exact test. The test does not 
detect a significant difference between players’ B 
decision when players A sent  or 
1t <
1t = 1t <  in the 




In this section, we first check whether the 
beliefs of players A on average match the observed 
behavior and the beliefs of players B about 
players’ A beliefs. In SEQ, 51% of players B 
returned HALF. Players A on average believed 
that 51% of players B would return HALF, and 
players B on average believed that players A 
believed that 51% of players B would return 
HALF. Thus in SEQ data, players’ A beliefs are 
not significantly different from the actual choices 
(p=0.78) nor from players’ B beliefs (p=0.81). 
Along the same lines, 27% of players B in 
SIM returned HALF. Players A on average 
believed that 46% of players B would return 
HALF, and players B on average believed that 
players A believed that 37% of players B would 
return HALF. Players’ A beliefs are significantly 
higher from the actual choices of players B 
(p<0.01). On the other hand, players’ A beliefs are 
not significantly different from B’s beliefs 
(p=0.13), although as the relatively low p-value 
indicates, this result is not as strong as in SEQ. 
Next, we compare the beliefs across 
treatments to verify whether our conclusions from 
the previous section are supported. Recall that 
players A choose on average higher t in SEQ than 
in SIM. Given that, our theory predicts that the 
beliefs of players A in SEQ should be higher than 
those in SIM. Similarly, the beliefs of players B in 
SEQ should be higher than those in SIM. 
The average belief of players A in SEQ is 
higher than in SIM. We test whether difference is 
significant using 1-sided Mann-Whitney test. The 
hypothesis does not receive considerable support 
in the data (p=0.264). However, the direction is 
correct.  On the other hand, the hypothesis that the 
beliefs of players B is higher in SEQ than in SIM 
is supported at p<0.01 significance level. 
The two most appropriate tests of trust 
signaling using beliefs are the comparison of 
beliefs of players A who chose  versus those 
who chose 
1t =
1t <  and of players B who returned 
ZERO versus those who returned HALF in 
treatment SEQ. The theory requires the following 
two statements to be true: 
Beliefs 1 Beliefs 1
Beliefs HALF Beliefs ZERO.
SEQ SEQ
SEQ SEQ




The average belief of players A who chose 1t =  
in treatment SEQ is equal to 64.19 where as of 
those who chose 1t <  is equal to 36.40. A Mann-
Whitney test detects a significant difference 
between the two samples at a p<0.01 level. 
The average belief of players B who 
chose HALF and ZERO in treatment SEQ is 53.95 
and 46.67, respectively. The data includes a pair of 
outliers. Since the beliefs are bounded by 0 from 
below and 100 from above, we accepted a data 
point to be an outlier if it is more than two 
standard deviations from the mean. We find one 
such outlier among the players B who returned 
HALF (Belief = 15) and another among players B 
who returned ZERO (Belief = 95). After removing 
them from the sample, the averages become 56.00 
and 45.30, respectively. A 1-sided Mann-Whitney 
shows that the beliefs of players B who returned 
HALF are higher at p=0.058 significance level. 
We conclude that the guilt aversion prediction for 
the presence of trust signaling in supported by the 





We set out to study trust in two 
environments that allow different degrees of 
strategic behavior. In the first environment players 
A and B make decisions in a trust game 
simultaneously and in the second they make 
decisions sequentially. The main difference is that 
in the first game the trust of the first mover A in 
B’s fair response derives purely from A’s personal, 
subjective (inherent) belief about the likelihood of 
fair response in a population. In the second 
environment B observes whether he was trusted or 
not before he makes his choice and hence his 
response will likely depend on A’s action. We find 
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there is more to trust than meets the eye. Our 
model, which relies on guilt-averse preferences, 
predicts that if agents are sufficiently sensitive to 
trust (i.e., guilt), then B will always behave fairly 
if he observed he was trusted. This is not 
necessarily so when B does not observe what A 
has done. Hence, we expect that in a sequentially 
played trust game A invests more often in order to 
induce B to behave fairly than if the game is 
played simultaneously.  In other words, A uses 
trust strategically (or signals trust) in the former 
and not in the latter environment. 
The results of our experiments for the 
most part confirm our conjectures. We find that the 
first movers invest significantly more in the 
sequential than in the simultaneous trust game. 
Similarly the second movers respond fairly in 
significantly higher proportion in the sequential 
versus simultaneous trust game. In our model 
changes in behavior are driven by the 
heterogeneity in players’ beliefs. To verify that our 
model fits the data we elicit beliefs. As expected, 
players have on average higher beliefs in the 
sequentially than in the simultaneously played 
trust game. Our results indicate that in the 
environment that allows players to credibly 
communicate trust, i.e., where one player is able to 
signal trust in another player, the relationship has 
higher chances of forming than in the environment 
where this is not true. Our results are relevant from 
theoretical standpoint but also from he point of 
view of designing institutions. We found that in 
certain environments (i.e., that allow trust-
signaling) the two involved parties can create trust 
and hence form relationship on their own. Thus we 
advocate designing institutions that allows full or 
partial display of trusting behavior because this 
would, in line with our findings, enhance the 
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